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Executive summary 
In the wake of violent conflict and mass 
atrocity, there are many contending 
demands, including those for peace and 
stability, and those for accountability and 
punishment.  Much ink has been spilled in 
debating “justice versus peace”.  Two key 
trends in peacebuilding and transitional 
justice may clash with one another in 
particular: the prevalence of disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) 
programs and the increased emphasis on 
victim-centred approaches to peacebuilding. 
Funded by the United States Institute of 
Peace, this project and a forthcoming book, 
Transitional justice and peacebuilding on the ground: 
Victims and ex-combatants sought to identify 
lessons of utility for policymakers engaged 
in peacebuilding and transitional justice 
activities along three related topics:  
 First, the opportunities for closer 
linkages between transitional justice 
measures and development activities 
in a peacebuilding context.  
 Second, the opportunities and risks 
of developing DDR and victim-
centred justice activities in tandem, 
either in broad cooperation or in a 
more tightly integrated fashion.  
 And finally, it considered options for 
timing and sequencing of DDR and 
victim-oriented transitional justice 
processes, recognizing that the 
timing of DDR processes may be 
relatively inflexible and dictated by 
the demands of peace agreements 
and need to stabilize a situation.  
We identify the risks and, where possible, 
opportunities, of choices in all three areas, 
offering not prescriptions, but guidance, 
regarding key challenges for practitioners to 
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Development and transitional justice in 
peacebuilding contexts 
Although transitional justice and 
development activities have not historically 
been formally linked, they inevitably affect 
one another, not least because transitional 
justice activities, like the conflicts they often 
follow or accompany, frequently occur in 
countries with significant development 
needs and external development 
involvement. In many countries emerging 
from conflict, poverty levels are extremely 
high. How can transitional justice and 
peacebuilding objectives and programs take 
into account the complex challenges of 
poverty and inequality in these situations? 
Opportunities 
Low and middle income countries use 
national development plans and poverty 
reduction strategies as central policymaking 
tools. Such plans and strategies may, and in 
some cases do, include transitional justice 
and peacebuilding activities. These activities, 
which include accountability for past human 
rights violations and the reintegration of 
former combatants, are expected by some 
programmers and analysts to promote the 
consolidation of the rule of law, the 
(re)establishment of civic trust and the 
reinforcement of public security. Linking 
development policies to transitional justice 
and peacebuilding activities may allow for 
more efficient use of scarce resources. In 
post-conflict societies, limited pools of 
trained staff, infrastructure and funds may 
be strained by the creation of new and often 
parallel institutions specifically designed for 
transitional justice and/or peacebuilding 
activities. Using existing institutions to 
pursue transitional justice activities could 
alleviate the pressure on resources, and 
might also contribute to the sensitization of 
officials in state bureaucracies regarding 
accountability and victims’ rights. In 
Colombia, the national development agency 
Acción Social was tasked with providing 
assistance to internally displaced people. The 
organization was then well-placed, based on 
this experience, to support the 
establishment of the national victim 
reparations program authorized in 
legislation in 2011.  
Risks 
While national development strategies might 
be designed to promote mechanisms that 
facilitate access to justice, reform of security 
policies, or coordination between public 
services and victim reparations programs, 
good practices in this area are still scarce. In 
Uganda, inclusion of transitional justice and 
peacebuilding measures in development 
policies was counterproductive. Uganda’s 
attempt to combine a range of activities 
through comprehensive development 
policies seems to be more a response to 
pressures from international donors than a 
serious attempt to consider the implications 
and requirements of each area: transitional 
justice, peacebuilding, poverty, development. 
Uganda’s incorporation of transitional 
justice and peacebuilding in national 
development plans watered down both 
transitional justice and peacebuilding 
activities, due to the combined effect of 
limited state capacity with limited political 
commitment. 
Accountability for past atrocities can strain 
development activities, including the 
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promotion of the ordinary rule of law, 
particularly where the national judicial 
system is tasked with prosecution of mass 
human rights violations or war crimes. In 
Bosnia, significant resources have been 
provided to the state level War Crimes 
Chamber. However, local courts (at entity 
level) also have jurisdiction over war crimes 
and some argue that police, prosecutorial 
resources, and court time have been 
diverted from the investigation and 
adjudication of ordinary crimes.   
Possibly the most serious risk is presented 
by the gap between what governments and 
donors promise and victims expect and 
what is delivered. Practitioners create 
expectations for, and victims often demand, 
a range of outcomes, from truth to criminal 
accountability, to memorials to reparations 
to reconciliation. In practice, however, 
practitioners must make pragmatic decisions 
regarding resources, including allocation of 
and provision of other nonmonetary forms 
of reparation.   
Transitional justice is not a panacea for all of 
the social problems which societies in 
transition might experience. While 
transitional justice practitioners must be 
aware of wider demands for distributive 
justice, particularly given that uneven 
distribution of wealth and land may have 
been the cause and/or the consequence of 
earlier conflict and abuse, the tools of 
transitional justice are not necessarily suited 
to address structural inequalities.  
What should transitional justice and peacebuilding 
practitioners consider when addressing development-
related issues? 
Victims may not prioritize criminal 
accountability or a truth commission report, 
and be more focused on finding a job, 
securing food and healthcare, or taking care 
of a disabled relative. Any reparations 
program must be attentive to who victims 
are and what they need. The situation of 
reparations provided to victims, including 
amputees, in Sierra Leone, illustrates this 
clearly. One- off lump-sum cash payments 
are ill-suited for individuals with long-term 
needs, not only amputees but also victims of 
debilitating trauma. Such victims are likely to 
require longer-term, sustained support. 
There is also the risk of falsely raising hopes 
among victims that they will receive regular 
payments. The sense of abandonment that 
victim communities often experience might 
be increased by unfounded expectations. 
While certain groups of victims may need 
monetary compensation, many transitional 
societies facing poverty and development 
challenges will only be able to provide 
limited reparations. A combination of 
individual reparations and collective 
reparations in the form of services might 
provide a variety of measures that may at 
least partly fulfill the needs and interests of 
victims and might be compatible with 
development-oriented policies and programs.   
Coordination and integration 
Is it possible to coordinate between or 
amongst the various activities of 
peacebuilding and transitional justice, linking 
measures which seek to address needs and 
demands of victims, and measures which 
seek immediate DDR and longer-term 
reintegration of former combatants?   
There are evident tensions between victim-
centred justice and DDR. Nonetheless, such 
processes often operate in close proximity 
to one another— often in the same territory, 
at the same time, involving some of the 
same programmers and/or beneficiaries.  
They may also involve overlapping sets of 
service providers—state, international, or 
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local. Thus it is worth asking: could these 
activities be coordinated with one another, 
or even integrated?   
In many postconflict countries, justice 
processes and DDR have clearly not been 
coordinated, and have often either been in 
tension with one another or have not 
occurred contemporaneously.  Even in 
those cases where both types of processes 
were developed, they seemed not to be 
designed to communicate with one another.  
However, the United Nations Integrated 
Disarmament, Demoblization and 
Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) illustrate a 
trend at the United Nations towards 
integrating DDR programming with wider 
peacebuilding measures, which increasingly 
include transitional justice processes. The 
subsequent inclusion of a transitional justice 
module in the IDDRS reinforces this trend. 
There appears to be an expectation that 
transitional justice and DDR have shared 
linked goals, of building trust between 
excombatants and society and between 
victims and society. While there is scant 
evidence of such coordination, much less 
integration, as a matter of deliberate 
programming in-country to date, it is worth 
considering the opportunities and risks of a 
more coordinated or even integrated 
approach.  
Opportunities 
Coordinating victim-centred justice and 
DDR processes could allow for mutual 
reinforcement, provided appropriate 
incentive structures could be put in place.  
This might perhaps mitigate the seemingly 
zero-sum nature of each activity.  How 
might this work in practice? One incentive, 
amnesties, is arguably off of the table; the 
IDDRS rule out amnesties based on their 
presumed inconsistency with international 
legal standards. In Colombia, combatants 
who had not committed crimes and had no 
criminal charges against them were granted 
amnesty, and those who were facing 
criminal charges were offered reduced 
sentences as incentives for demobilization. 
While blanket amnesties are inconsistent 
with international standards, the use of 
conditional amnesties might in some 
instances help to promote demobilization.  
At the same time, prosecutions are likely to 
undermine demobilization, but is this always 
the case?  Certainly, some members of 
armed groups may choose not to disarm out 
of fear of prosecution, as appears to have 
initially been the case in Sierra Leone.  
However, punitive, reintegrative, and 
reparative processes could be linked, to a 
degree.  Where excombatants have engaged 
in serious abuses, it might be possible to 
promote acceptance of their return by 
victims and communities by linking 
reintegration to traditional justice activities. 
Truth commissions may provide an 
opportunity for excombatants who were 
perpetrators of serious abuses to apologize 
and seek forgiveness. Traditional or local 
justice might also enable perpetrators to 
engage victims and communities. In 
northern Uganda and to a degree in Sierra 
Leone, communities have utilized ritual 
cleansing and other traditional ceremonies 
to promote reintegration by former child 
combatants in particular.  
If former combatants provide a material 
compensation, this might also enable their 
reintegration into communities. The process 
in Colombia has linked demobilisation of 
illegal armed groups to accountability 
processes, including truth-seeking, 
administrative reparations, and judicial 
processes in which victims can also seek 




Of course, former combatants and entire 
armed groups may not accept the linkage of 
processes. This may be the case because 
they reject individually, or collectively, the 
stain of accusations of human rights 
violations, or because they simply reject the 
prospect of punishment. This has also been 
the case in Colombia; some paramilitaries 
withdrew from the DDR process as 
amendments to the Law of Justice and 
Peace progressively altered its content, 
creating tighter linkages between transitional 
justice and DDR but also imposing greater 
obligations upon armed groups.  
Victims and victims’ groups might also 
reject the linkages. Again in Colombia, many 
victims view the Law of Justice and Peace as 
one of impunity, designed to assist pro-
government forces, and neither contributing 
to the end of conflict nor addressing 
victims’ rights. While this approach linking 
return and engagement with victims may 
involve formal state processes, in some 
countries traditional justice processes are 
used to link return and victims, with 
problematic results, and either state-based or 
traditional processes may be criticized for 
instrumentalizing victims. In Sierra Leone, 
the use of traditional cleansing mechanisms 
to promote the return of former child 
soldiers has met with some skepticism.  .  
DDR programmes tend to focus on short-
term activities and are often less successful 
at long-term reintegration. Some argue that 
reintegration might be better left to 
communities or to longer-term development 
work. Development actors, working with 
governments and a range of peacebuilders, 
are likely to be engaged in supporting 
transitional justice activities and wider rule 
of law reform, support to affected 
communities, and reconstruction. They 
might be better placed to promote longer-
term reintegration, and enable greater 
integration between those peacebuilding and 
transitional justice activities. However, there 
is also a risk that such an approach would 
generate the perception that there is a zero-
sum competition amongst beneficiaries, or 
create incentives to promote reintegration 
over concerns of communities and victims. 
What should transitional justice and peacebuilding 
practitioners take into account when considering 
coordination and integration? 
Practitioners engaged in DDR and justice 
processes need  to understand one another’s 
goals, tools, and constituents, prior to 
considering any degree of coordination, 
much less integration. Experience to date 
suggests that coordination has been 
relatively rare, and not necessarily strategic. 
Given the potential opportunities and risks 
noted above, those seeking to program these 
activities might want to assess the situation 
through a number of queries. 
First, they should consider the likely 
responses of victims, excombatants, and 
affected communities alike to any linked 
processes. Excombatants, particularly those 
who have not perpetrated atrocities, may 
well resent and resist the linkage of DDR, 
and particularly reintegration, to formal and 
informal processes which conflate them 
with perpetrators of serious crimes. Victims 
and communities as well, may resent that 
their forgiveness is expected to facilitate 
return, i.e. that linking the two 
instrumentalizes those most harmed by past 
abuses. 
Second, practitioners considering using 
traditional or local mechanisms of justice or 
conflict resolution should carefully scope 
the appropriateness of these in the eyes of 
those expected to be involved.  If such 
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mechanisms are not appropriate because 
they and their practitioners have lost respect 
or legitimacy through the course of the 
conflict, or because they do not function 
well across communities, their effects will be 
limited. 
Third, they should consider existing 
institutional capacity in the postconflict state.  
This includes the financial capacity to 
engage in DDR processes, particular 
reintegration, or in transitional justice 
processes including trials, truth commissions, 
and/or reparations, as well as to manage the 
proliferation of institutions which may result. 
Timing and sequencing 
Clearly no rigid ordering or timetable can be 
prescribed for a diverse set of situations. 
Further, any recommendations are 
necessarily limited by the fact that DDR will, 
for pragmatic reasons, generally have 
temporal and financial priority, even if 
justice processes are also being undertaken 
alongside conflict resolution efforts in some 
countries. At least the disarmament and 
demobilization (or DD) elements of DDR 
will usually be undertaken first, given the 
need to stabilize a country and implement a 
peace agreement. DDR processes have not 
been successful at promoting longer-term 
social reintegration, it may be that this is 
best left to transitional justice processes. 
That said, there are serious temporal 
considerations that need to be addressed as 
DDR goes forward and justice processes are 
initiated.  In reviewing the findings of our 
project concerning timing and sequencing, 
we could identify clear risks, but no clear 
opportunities. Below we only discuss risks 
and provide some guidance for practitioners. 
Risks 
Long delays between DDR and victim-
centred justice can have deleterious effects. 
Clearly, even if DD must have temporal 
priority, the resentment felt by victims and 
communities as a result  of long delays to 
reparations programs or truth-telling and 
justice processes can be limited if such 
processes are initiated relatively early. While 
in Sierra Leone, the TRC and the Special 
Court began operation within a few years of 
the end of conflict, there remains skepticism 
about their effects on, or reception by, 
victims.  The reparations process, by 
contrast, took place some nine years after 
the end of conflict. The apparent disparity 
between the rapid provision of DDR 
training and packages and delayed 
reparations can create resentment amongst 
victims. Further, victims who have suffered 
serious material harm may suffer further in 
the meantime, particularly where the harms 
they have suffered impede gainful 
employment or basic daily personal tasks.  
However these risks may be unavoidable. 
Many victim-centred approaches to justice 
simply cannot be set up as quickly as DDR 
programs in the wake of conflict. It takes 
time to develop a mandate for a commission 
of inquiry, to appoint commissioners and 
other staff, and develop operating 
procedures, even if sufficient funds are 
available, which may not be the case.  Those 
seeking to create reparations programs must 
raise a budget, create a new institution or 
adapt and empower an existing one, create a 
victims’ registry, and develop procedures for 
distribution of funds and benefits. 
Programmers and analysts need realistic 
timeframes for the implementation of 
transitional justice mechanisms in general 
and victim-centred justice in particular; these 
are long-term processes. Processes of 
implementation may take longer than the 
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usual three-to-five year programming cycles 
of donors and international organizations. 
What should transitional justice and peacebuilding 
practitioners take into account when considering 
timing and sequencing? 
Victim-centred justice processes, particularly 
reparations programs, take significant 
amounts of time to implement, yet 
something needs to be done in the 
meantime. This is a moral and practical 
dilemma. Humanitarian, peacebuilding, and 
development actors may well have to fill the 
gap with direct assistance. Their activities 
are unlikely to have a specific justice and/or 
reparations aspect, but nonetheless may be 
more timely than oft-delayed victim-centred 
processes. However, it is worth noting that 
it does not appear to be the case that, as the 
saying goes, “justice delayed is justice 
denied”. Rather, demands for justice in a 
range of forms—truth-telling, trials, 
reparations—clearly remain active, even 
growing, long after the original atrocities 
occurred. 
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